Section 215.13 (4), Stats., provides that savings and loan companies “pay savings accounts in whole or in part in accordance with p. 215.17.” In section 215.17, paragraph 1, clubs can pay withdrawals from their savings accounts and provide that the association “can pay the payment value to the owners of such savings accounts.” The statutes also provide that the association “. . . [p]ay the saver” after receiving written payment requests, art. 215.17 (4) a), and that “saver is paid,” the request for payment, art. 215.17(4) c. The complainants assert that the use of mutuals to make withdrawals from the Higher Account II constitutes the payment of withdrawals to third parties in violation of these legal mandates. Second, we reject the Court of Appeal`s analogy with the principle that promotes the anterity of elected officials in action. First, we draw attention to the fact that the Tribunal expressly objected to any direct application of the transfer principle. Wisconsin Bankers Asso. v. Mutual Savings – Loan Asso., s.a., 494 n.
17. However, the Court of Appeal characterized the principle as an example of a trend towards increasing economic flexibility, shared by both legislators and the courts, and found that Mutual`s use of the draft vision was consistent with the trend. Id. at 495. The existence of the trend that has been reported to the Court of Appeal, namely that section 215.17, Stats., should not be construed as prohibiting vision projects if there is no language 453 that requires such interpretation. Id. This is essentially a variation of the waiver. “The maxim of construction is well known: a status of revision or modification of a common law rule or principle must be clearly expressed in order to leave no doubt as to the intention of the legislature. Orton v.
Noonan and McNab, 29 Wis. 541, 545 (1872). See also: Page, Statutes in Derogation of Common Law: The Canon as an Analytical Tool, 1956 Wis. L. Rev. 78. For the rule to apply (1), there must be a relevant or possibly present legal doctrine for the issue raised by the parties; 2. The status at issue must be a statute which, interpreted as the party that invoked it, would work towards amending the common law; and (3) the status must be ambiguous on his face.
These three shown, a court was then justified to expose the statutes narrowly, having the least possible impact when amending the common law. Id. at 97. In the case of the Law Society, the general tendency of the law, which favours the transfer of elected officials, is relevant only to the extent that the relationship between the association and the applicant can be characterized as a debtor-creditor. The case law  and our own statutes indicate that this may not be appropriate. More importantly, paragraph 215.17 is not vulnerable to work, given the derogation. As the Court of Appeal understood, the part is of a regular nature. Wisconsin Bankers Asso. v. Mutual Savings – Loan Asso., 498-99.
It is therefore entitled to a liberal construct and should not be interpreted in a restrictive manner, as if by deviation from the rules of the common law.